An abstract framework of canonical inference is used to explore how different proof orderings induce different variants of saturation and completeness. Notions like completion, paramodulation, saturation, redundancy elimination, and rewrite-system reduction are connected to proof orderings. Fairness of deductive mechanisms is defined in terms of proof orderings, distinguishing between (ordinary) "fairness," which yields completeness, and "uniform fairness," which yields saturation. 
INTRODUCTION
For effective automated reasoning, the ability to ignore irrelevant data is just as important as the capability to derive consequences from given information. Thus, theorem provers generally incorporate various mechanisms for controlling the growth of the collection of inferred formulae or derived goals. It is a challenge, however, to ensure that such rules for simplification or deletion of formulae do not impinge upon the completeness of the resulting theorem proving strategy.
One class of inference engines that make heavy use of simplification includes the Knuth-Bendix completion procedure for equational inference [Knuth and Bendix 1970 ] and Buchberger's Gröbner-basis algorithm for polynomial ideals [Buchberger 1985 ]. These forward-reasoning systems aim at generating sets of formulae that are "complete" in the sense that completion can provide a rewriting-based decision procedure for validity in the given equational theory, and that the Gröbner basis is similarly used to decide membership in the ideal. Ballantyne (cited in Dershowitz et al. [1988] ) and Metivier [1983] took note of the fact that the fully reduced result of completion is unique for given axioms and term ordering. Brown [1975] , for the Horn case, and Lankford [1975] , for the general case, showed how to combine equational completion with clausal resolution, improving upon the original paramodulation [Robinson and Wos 1969] , a line of investigation that later produced methods based on ordered resolution and ordered paramodulation [Hsiang and Rusinowitch 1991; Bachmair and Ganzinger 1994; Nieuwenhuis and Rubio 2001] . Huet [1981] showed how Knuth's completion procedure can also play the rôle of an incomplete prover for equational validity. Hsiang and Rusinowitch [1987] and Bachmair, Dershowitz and Plaisted ] designed unfailing versions of completion, without compromising the powerful rôle of simplification in controlling the completion process.
In the following sections, we suggest that proof orderings, rather than formula orderings, take center stage in theorem proving with contraction (simplification and deletion of formulae). Given a specific proof ordering, completeness of a set of formulae-which we refer to as a presentation-will mean that all derivable theorems enjoy a minimal proof, while completeness of an inference system will mean that all formulae needed as premises in such ideal proofs can be inferred. This formalism is very flexible, since it allows small proofs to use large premises, and vice-versa.
Well-founded orderings of proofs, as developed in Bachmair and Dershowitz [1994] , distinguish between economical, "direct" proofs, namely those that are of a computational flavor (e.g., rewrite proofs), and expensive "indirect" proofs, those that are discovered after performing a search (e.g., equational proofs). These proof orderings are lifted from orderings on terms and formulae. Given a formula ordering, we can, of course, choose to compare proofs by simply comparing (the multiset of) their premises.
Our proof-ordering-based approach to deduction suggests generalizations of the current concepts of "saturation," "redundancy," and "fairness." Saturated, for us, will mean that all inexpensive proofs are supported, as opposed to completeness, which makes do with one minimal proof per theorem. Accordingly, we define two notions of fairness: A fair derivation generates a complete set in the limit, while a uniformly fair derivation generates a saturated limit. By considering different orderings on proofs, we get different kinds of saturated sets. The notion of saturation in theorem proving, in which superfluous deductions are not necessary for completeness, was suggested in Rusinowitch [1991] . In our terminology: A presentation was said to be saturated when all inferrible formulae are syntactically subsumed by formulae in the presentation. 1 We also define redundancy in terms of the proof ordering, as propounded in Bonacina and Hsiang [1995] : A sentence is redundant if adding it to the presentation does not decrease any minimal proof (see Bonacina 1992, Chap. 2) . The definition of redundancy in Bachmair and Ganzinger [1994] -an inference is redundant if its conclusion can be inferred from smaller formulae-coincides with ours when proofs are measured first by their maximal premises. In Ganzinger [1994, 2001] , and Nieuwenhuis and Rubio [2001] , saturated means that every possible inference is redundant.
The present work continues the development of an abstract theory of "canonical inference," begun in Dershowitz and Kirchner [2006] , which, in turn, grew out of the theory of rewriting (see, e.g., Dershowitz and Plaisted [2001] , Terese [2003] ) and deduction (see, e.g., Bonacina [1999] , Bachmair and Ganzinger [2001] , and Nieuwenhuis and Rubio [2001] ). Although we will use ground equations as an illustrative example, this framework applies equally well in the first-order setting, whether equational or clausal. Our motivations and contributions are primarily aesthetic and intellectual: -organizing the theory of "canonical inference" in an architecture with primitive objects (such as presentations and proofs), their properties (canonical presentations, normal-form proofs), mappings between objects (inferences, derivations), their properties (good inferences, fair derivations), and theorems that state the weakest possible sufficient conditions for the desirable properties; -keeping the treatment throughout as abstract as possible so as to maximize generality without losing sight of concrete instances; -providing a terminology that is simultaneously general and precise; and -assembling a notation that is at the same time elegant, compact, and helpful.
Since good theory produces the simplicity of concepts and clarity of priorities that are key to the building of strong systems, our hope is that this work might also nurture practical applications.
The next section sets the stage with basic notions and notations, and introduces a running example. To keep this article self-contained, Section 3 recapitulates relevant definitions and results from Dershowitz and Kirchner [2006] .
2 Specifically, the canonical basis of an abstract deductive system is defined in three equivalent ways: (1) formulae appearing in minimal proofs; (2) minimal trivial theorems; and (3) nonredundant lemmata. Section 4 articulates the abstract framework by introducing inferences and proof procedures, providing proofs with structure, and characterizing good inference sequences. Sections 5-7 carry out the study of derivation and completion processes. Finally, we close with a discussion in Section 8, including related work and connections with the praxis of theorem proving.
ORDERED PROOF SYSTEMS
Let A be the set of all formulae (ground equations and disequations, in our examples) over some fixed vocabulary. Let P be the set of all (ground equational) proofs. These sets of abstract objects are linked by two functions: Pm : P → 2 A gives the premises (assumptions) in a proof, and Cl : P → A gives its conclusion. c, b) . Both functions extend to sets of proofs in the usual fashion. The framework proposed here is predicated on two well-founded partial orderings over P: a proof ordering ≥ and a subproof relation . They are related by a monotonicity requirement given to follow, namely, (Eq. (7)). If the best proof of a theorem c requires some lemma b, this monotonicity condition precludes the possibility that the best proof of b turn around and use c, since then ultimately both b and c would be needed to support all ideal proofs, and there would be no "localized" way of knowing when a formula is never needed and truly redundant. On the other hand, this monotonicity condition does allow b to be better in some proof contexts and c in others.
For convenience, we assume that the proof ordering only compares proofs with the same conclusion ( p ≥ q ⇒ [ p] Cl = [q] Cl ), rather than mention this condition each time we have cause to compare proofs.
We use the standard notation A c, for premises A ⊆ A and conclusion c ∈ A, to mean that there exists a proof p ∈ P such that [ p] Pm = A and [ p] Cl = c. We will use the term presentation to mean a set of formulae, and justification to mean a set of proofs. Given a presentation A, the set of all proofs using all or some premises of A is denoted by:
We reserve the term theory for deductively-closed presentations. Let Th A denote the theory of presentation A, that is, the set of conclusions of all proofs with premises in A:
The study in Dershowitz and Kirchner [2006] is concerned with defining abstract properties of sets of formulae. It is extended here with notions, such as fairness, that describe properties of derivations.
That article is about properties of objects (presentations); we study properties required of processes (derivations) so as to generate the desired presentations. 3 We use We presume the following standard properties of Tarskian consequence relations:
for all A, B and c. It follows from the definition of Th that
Thus, Th is a closure operation. On account of the (left) weakening property of Eq.
(1), we need not distinguish between A c, meaning that there is a proof of c using all the premises A, or using just some. As a very simple running example, let the vocabulary consist of the constant 0 and unary symbol s. Abbreviate tally terms s i 0 as numeral i. The set A consists of all unordered equations i = j ; so symmetry is built into the structure of proofs (we postpone dealing with disequations for the time being). An equational inference system (with this vocabulary) might consist of the following five inference rules:
where boxes surround premises, Z is an axiom, I introduces premises, and S infers i + 1 = j + 1 from a proof of i = j . Proof-tree branches of the transitivity rule T are unordered. Projections P allow irrelevant premises to be ignored and are needed to accommodate monotonicity, that is, Eq. (1). For example, if A = {4 = 2, 4 = 0}, then
Consider the proof schemata:
where p 0 is a proof of i − j − 2 = 0. Let's use proof terms for proofs, denoting the preceding three trees (from left-to-right) by p = S i Z , q = S i I (4, 2) and and [r] Cl is the formula i = j .
• M. P. Bonacina and N. Dershowitz With a (multiset) recursive path ordering [Dershowitz 1982 ] to order proofs, and a precedence Z < S < T < I < P < 0 < 1 < 2 < · · · on proof combinators and vocabulary symbols, the minimal proof of a theorem in Th A takes one of the forms
where the subproofs ∇ 4k=0 and ∇ 4k=2 are defined recursively:
We call a proof trivial when it proves its only premise and has no subproofs other than itself, that is, if
We denote by a a or a such a trivial proof of a ∈ A, and by A the set of trivial proofs of each a ∈ A. For example, 4=0 = I (4, 0).
We assume that premises appear in proofs (5), that subproofs do not use nonextant premises (6), and that proof orderings are monotonic with respect to (replacement of) subproofs (7). Specifically, for all proofs p, q, r, and formulae a:
We make no other assumptions regarding proofs or their structure. The intuition for assumption (5), "proofs use their premises," is related to the distinction between proof and derivation. Informally, a derivation contains all formulae generated by a deduction mechanism from a given input, while a proof of a formula generated during the derivation contains all, and only, the formulae involved in inferring this formula within this proof (derivations will be treated formally in Section 5). The Replacement Postulate (7) states that and > (which we have restricted to proofs with the same conclusion) commute. In other words, "replacing" a subproof q of a proof p with a strictly smaller proof r "results" in a proof v that is smaller than the original p, and which does not involve extraneous premises. This postulate implies the following weaker commutation property:
Most proof orderings in the literature obey this monotonicity requirement. Every formula a admits a trivial proof a a by Eqs. (2) and (5). On account of (5 and 7), proofs are also monotonic with respect to any inessential premises they refer to, should the latter admit smaller than trivial proofs.
It may be convenient to think of a proof-tree "leaf " as a subproof with only itself as a subproof; other subproofs are the "subtrees." There are two kinds of leaves: trivial proofs a a (such as inferences I), and vacuous proofs (axioms) a with [ā] Pm = ∅ and [ā] Cl = a (such as Z). By well-foundedness of , there are no infinite "paths" in proof trees. It follows from Replacement (7) that the transitive closure of > ∪ is also well-founded.
CANONICAL PRESENTATIONS
The results in this section are extracted from Dershowitz and Kirchner [2006] , which should be consulted for proofs not given here.
Define the minimal proofs in a set of proofs as:
On account of well-foundedness, minimal proofs always exist. Note that Pm, Cl, Th and Pf are all monotonic with respect to set inclusion, but μPf is not. Indeed, A ⊆ B does not imply μPf (A) ⊆ μPf (B), and P ⊆ Q does not imply μP ⊆ μQ, because a proof p that is minimal in P need not be minimal in Q, since Q may contain a q < p such that q / ∈ P . Also, μP ⊆ μQ does not imply P ⊆ Q, since P may contain all sorts of nonminimal proofs not in Q.
We say that presentation A is contracted when A = [μPf (A)] Pm , that is, A contains precisely the premises used in minimal proofs based on A. By a "normal-form proof," we mean a minimal proof using any theorem as a lemma (that is, as a premise):
The normal-form proofs of a presentation A are the set
This leads to our main definition: Definition 3.2 (Canonical Presentation). The canonical presentation A of A contains those formulae that appear as premises of normal-form proofs:
So, we will say that A is canonical if A = A .
It follows from the definitions that
The next proposition gives a second characterization of the canonical presentation-as normal-form trivial theorems:
. The function is "canonical" with respect to the equivalence of presentations. That is:
By lifting proof orderings to justifications and presentations, the canonical presentation can be characterized directly in terms of the ordering. First, proof orderings are lifted to sets of proofs, as follows:
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-Justification Q is better than justification P if:
Recall that only proofs with the same conclusion are compared by proof orderings. Transitivity of these three relations follows from the definitions. They are compatible: (
Since it is also reflexive, is a quasiordering. Note that is not merely the strict version of , since every proof in P must have a strictly smaller one in Q.
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The next proposition states that subproofs of minimal proofs are minimal, bigger presentations may offer better proofs, and minimal proofs are the best. 
(c) For all justifications P :
This "better than" quasiordering on proofs is lifted to a "simpler than" quasiordering on (equivalent) sets of formulae, as follows:
-Presentation B is simpler than an equivalent presentation A when B provides better proofs than does A:
-Presentations are similar if their proofs are:
Similarity ≈ is the equivalence relation associated with .
These relations are also compatible. Canonicity may be characterized in terms of this quasiordering:
4 The strict version of would say P Q P , that is, ∀ p ∈ P. ∃q ∈ Q. p ≥ q and ∃q ∈ Q. ∀ p ∈ P. q < p. On the other hand, P Q says that ∀ p ∈ P. ∃q ∈ Q. p > q. This is why we use the term "much better" and not "strictly better." THEOREM 3.8. The canonical presentation is the simplest:
Recalling that all subproofs of normal-form proofs are also in normal form (Proposition 3.6), we propose the following definitions:
Definition 3.9 (Saturation and Completeness).
-A presentation A is saturated if it supports all possible normal-form proofs:
-A presentation A is complete if every theorem has a normal-form proof:
It can be shown that:
presentation A is saturated if and only if
A presentation is complete if it is saturated, but for the converse, we need an additional hypothesis: minimal proofs are unique if, for all theorems c ∈ [Pf (A)] Cl , there is exactly one proof in Nf (A) with conclusion c. In particular, this holds for proof orderings that are total (on proofs of the same theorem). Bear in mind that abstract proofs may be designed to represent whole equivalence classes of concrete proofs. If a theorem has two distinct normal-form proofs p and q, a presentation A such that p ∈ Pf (A), but q / ∈ Pf (A), may be complete but not saturated. For example, suppose all rewrite (valley) proofs are minimal, but incomparable. In this situation, every Church-Rosser system is complete, since every identity has a rewrite proof, but only the full deductive closure is saturated because for every identity, it offers all rewrite proofs.
The next theorem relates canonicity and saturation.
THEOREM 3.12.
(a) A presentation A is saturated if and only if it contains its own canonical presentation:
A PROOF. By way of contradiction, let c ∈ A \ A . Since A is the set of all premises of normal-form proofs, c is not a premise of any such proof. So, let B = A \ {c}: B has the same normal-form proofs as does A, that is, one per theorem. It follows that B is complete, contrary to the hypothesis that A is setwise minimal. PROPOSITION 3.14. The following definition sets the stage for the third characterization of canonical presentation-as nonredundant lemmata. Formulae that can be removed from a presentation, without making proofs worse, are deemed "redundant:" Definition 3.15 (Redundancy).
-A formula r is redundant with respect to a presentation A when:
-The set of all redundant formulae of a given presentation A will be denoted as follows:
Thanks to the well-foundedness of >, the set of all redundant formulae in Red A is globally redundant: PROPOSITION 3.16. For all presentations A:
Pm ) if and only if it is irredundant (Red A = ∅).
Furthermore, every redundant r ∈ Red A has a minimal proof p ∈ μPf (A) in which it does not appear as a premise (r / ∈ [ p] Pm ). The third characterization of the canonical set is central to our purposes:
presentation is canonical if and only if it is saturated and contracted.
Informally, A is contracted if it is the set of premises of its minimal proofs; it is saturated if minimal proofs in A are exactly the normal-form proofs in the theory; it is canonical if it is the set of premises of normal-form proofs. Hence, saturated plus contracted is equivalent to canonical.
VARIATIONS ON CANONICITY
The idea we are promoting is that given a set of axioms, A, we are interested in the (unique) set of lemmata, A ⊆ Th A, which-when used as premises in proofs-supports all the normal-form proofs of the theorems Th A. These lemmata form the "canonical basis" of the theory. In this section, we observe how the canonical basis varies as the proof ordering varies.
Returning to our simple example, we take the five rules of Section 2 (reproduced here for convenience),
extend I and T to disequalities, and add a third rule for disequalities, as follows:
With these rules, we can infer, for instance, that 0 = 0 from 1 = 1 and 1 = 0, by applying I 1 =1 , F 0=1 , I 1 =0 and T:
Suppose we are using a proof ordering based on a precedence on the inference rules, or proof combinators, Z , I, S, P, T, F . For simplicity, we use > for both proof ordering and precedence. The intended meaning will be clear from the context. If F is smaller than all other proof combinators in the precedence, and I nodes are incomparable in the proof ordering, then the canonical basis of any inconsistent set is {i = j : i, j ∈ N}. All positive equations are redundant because F j =k is a smaller proof than I j =k .
If P > I in the precedence, then
By the Replacement Postulate (7), every application of P can be replaced by an application of I to yield a smaller proof. Hence, no minimal proof includes P steps. If proofs are compared in a simplification ordering (i.e., in an ordering for which subproofs are always smaller than their superproofs), then minimal proofs will never have superfluous transitivity inferences of the form
because the trivial proof of u = t (made of u = t, itself) is smaller.
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More specifically, suppose we are using something like the recursive path ordering for proof terms and consider the aforementioned inference rules for ground equality and disequality, with the rule for successor extended to apply to all function symbols of any arity. In other words, rule S, which infers si = sj from i = j , is generalized here to an inference rule for functional reflexivity (that infers f (x) = f (ȳ) fromx =ȳ) for any function symbol f , of any arity n, and n-tuplesx andȳ of variables.
Deductive closure. If the proof ordering prefers introduction I of premises over all other inferences (including Z), then trivial proofs are best. In this case, the whole theory is irredundant (Red Th A = ∅); and the canonical basis includes the whole theory (A = Th A). In other words, everything is needed because each sentence constitutes the smallest proof of itself.
Congruence closure. If the precedence makes functional reflexivity S smaller than I (more precisely: S < T < I ), but the only ordering on leaves is
from u = t by repeated applications of S yields a less expensive proof than
The canonical basis will be the congruence closure, as generated by paramodulation. Redundancies will have the form
. . , u n = t n ∈ Th A and function symbol f (of any arity n) in the vocabulary. Theory Th A is the closure under functional reflexivity of the basis A . If A is as in our first example (i.e., A = {4 = 2, 4 = 0}), then A = {2 j = 0 : j > 0}. The other equalities in Th A = {i = j : i ≡ j (mod 2)} are obtained from those in A by applying S (e.g., 8 = 4 is derived from 4 = 0 by applying S 4 to both sides). Completion. On the other hand, if the ordering on leaves compares terms in some simplification ordering ≥ ≥ (still assuming S < T < I ), then the canonical basis will be the fully contracted set, as generated by (ground) completion. The redundancies will be the trivialities u = u, for all terms u and equalities u = t, when there is a t = v ∈ Th A (v different than u) such that t v. Operationally, u = t can be contracted to u = v. For our first example with A = {4 = 2, 4 = 0}, we have A = {2 = 0}, as all equations in {2 j = 0 : j > 0} reduce to 2 = 0. For another example, if A = {a = c, sa = b} and sa sb sc a b c, then I (sa, b) > T (S (I (a, c) ), I (sc, b)), and I (sc, b) < T (S (I (a, c) ), I (sa, b)), hence A = {a = c, sc = b}.
Refutation. If T < I , the combinator F is the smallest in the precedence and I (i, j ) nodes are measured by the values of i and j , then the canonical basis of any inconsistent presentation is a (smallest) trivial disequation {t = t}. Indeed, all positive equations can be obtained by applying F to t = t, and all negated equations can be obtained by two applications of T :
for all numerals m, n, and t. Thus, the process of searching for a refutation of a given input set is the process of seeking its canonical basis, or forcing a minimal nucleus of inconsistency to emerge.
Superposition. In the ground case, completion can be done by simplification only. However, with a suitable ordering, we can also observe superposition. If we distinguish T steps based on the weight of the shared term j , making T > I when j is the greatest, and T < I otherwise, then the canonical basis is also closed under superposition, or paramodulation into the larger side of equations. For example, consider k = j and j = i. If the shared term j is the greatest, we have T (I (k, j ), I ( j, i) ) > I (k, i), meaning that adding k = i by superposition provides a smaller proof. The transitivity proof T (I (k, j ), I ( j, i) ) corresponds to the peak k ← j → i. Otherwise, we have T (I (k, j ), I ( j, i)) < I (k, i). In particular, if the shared term j is the smallest, the transitivity proof T (I (k, j ), I ( j, i) ) corresponds to a valley k → j ← i, and T (I (k, j ), I ( j, i)) < I (k, i) means that valley proofs are the smallest.
INFERENCE AND DERIVATIONS
There are two basic applications for ordering-based inference: constructing a finite canonical presentation when such exists, and searching for proofs by forward reasoning from axioms, avoiding inferences that do not help the search.
Inference steps are defined by deduction mechanisms. In general, a (one-step) deduction mechanism ; is a binary relation over presentations, and we call a pair, A ; B, a deduction step. A deduction mechanism is functional if for any A, there is a unique B (possibly A itself) such that A ; B. Practical mechanisms are functional (and usually operate deterministically); they are obtained by coupling an (nondeterministic) inference system with a search plan (or strategy), to yield a completion procedure or proof procedure. Specific procedures may impose additional structure, such as singling out one formula as the target theorem or "goal," in which case the deduction mechanism applies to labeled formulae; see Bonacina [1999] for a survey.
Here, we consider only functional mechanisms that apply to presentations, and take the notion of a deduction mechanism as a whole. Focusing attention on deduction mechanisms that apply to presentations entails no loss of generality, since the abstract set P may be limited on the concrete level to proofs and subproofs of a specific goal.
Goodness
A sequence of deductions A 0 ; A 1 ; · · · is called a derivation. 5 We write {A i } i for sequences of presentations, and-in particular-for derivations. Let A * = ∪ i A i be all formulae appearing anywhere in {A i } i . The result A ∞ of the sequence is (ever since Huet [1981] ) its persisting formulae:
We do not consider transfinite derivations in this article.
• M. P. Bonacina and N. Dershowitz We say that a proof p persists when its premises do, that is, when [ p] Pm ⊆ A ∞ . Thus, if p persists, so do its subproofs, by Postulate (6). By Proposition 3.6(b), we have Pf (A i ) Pf (A * ) for all i.
Definition 5.1 (Soundness and Adequacy).
Adequacy is essentially a monotonicity property, since it implies that Th A ⊆ Th B whenever A ; B.
We will concern ourselves only with sound and adequate derivations. In addition, we want derivations to improve gradually the presentation.
Definition 5.2 (Goodness).
A i+1 for all i. -A deduction mechanism ; is good if proofs only get better, in the sense that A B whenever A ; B.
Goodness is the cardinal principle of canonical inference. From here on in, only good, sound, adequate derivations will be considered.
Since the proof ordering is well-founded, we get:
LEMMA 5.3. For each presentation A i in a good derivation {A i } i , we have:
[ p] Cl = c} signify the proofs of formula c from any subset of presentation A.
PROOF. Let p i ∈ {A i c}. Since the derivation is good, there are proofs p j ∈ A j c for j > i such that p i ≥ p i+1 ≥ · · ·. By well-foundedness, from some point on, these are all the same proof q. Thus, [q] Pm ⊆ A ∞ , q ∈ Pf (A ∞ ) and Pf (A i ) Pf (A ∞ ). That Th A i ⊆ Th A ∞ follows then from the definitions.
Note 5.4. For bad (i.e., nongood) derivations, this is not the case. To wit, let
and consider {c} ; {b} ; {c} ; {b} ; · · ·. As the derivation oscillates perpetually between deriving b from c and c from b, at the limit A ∞ = ∅ and Th A ∞ = ∅, whereas Th A i = {b, c} for all finite i.
Canonicity
Canonicity of presentations leads to canonicity of derivations, in the sense that a derivation deserves to be considered canonical if it generates a canonical limit. More generally, a desirable attribute of presentations induces a corresponding characteristic of derivations that is sufficient to guarantee that the limit has the desirable attribute. The first ingredient for canonicity of derivations is the property that once something becomes redundant during a derivation, it will remain such forever, or "once redundant, always redundant." The following lemma implies that good derivations have this feature:
LEMMA 5.5. For all presentations A and B:
PROOF. Consider a proof p ∈ Pf (B) that uses a redundant premise a ∈ B ∩ Red A ⊆ A. Since, a ∈ Pf (A), by assumptions (1,2), a must also have an alternative (nontrivial) proof q ∈ {A \ {a} a} such that a > q. By assumption, there is an r ∈ Pf (B) such that q ≥ r. By the postulates of subproofs, p a > r implies the existence of a proof
Pm , then this process continues. It cannot continue forever, so we end up with a strictly smaller proof not involving a, establishing a's redundancy with regard to B.
PROPOSITION 5.6. If a derivation {A i } i is good, then its limit supports the best proofs:
A * ≈ A ∞
PROOF. One direction, namely Pf (A ∞ )
Pf (A * ), follows by Proposition 3.6(b) from the fact that A ∞ ⊆ A * . To establish that Pf (A * ) Pf (A ∞ ), we show that μPf (A * ) Pf (A ∞ ) and rely on Proposition 3.6(c). Suppose p ∈ μPf (A * ). It follows from Eq. (5) 
tracting means Red A ∞ = ∅, from which it follows that A ∞ ⊆ A 0 (by way of contradiction, if there were an x ∈ A ∞ , but x / ∈ A 0 , this x would be redundant, contradicting the contracting hypothesis). Together, these conclusions give A 0 = A ∞ . The other direction is trivial.
In summary, the limit of a derivation is complete, contracted, saturated, if the derivation is completing, contracting, saturating, respectively, where saturated is stronger than complete, and saturated and contracted together mean canonical.
Compactness
Goodness implies that if any proof shows up during a derivation, then there is a better or equal proof in the limit (cf. Lemma 5.3). The converse property, namely that if there is a proof in the limit, then there must also have been a proof along the way, is ensured by continuity: In other words, the operator μPf is continuous for any chain: The limit of the chain of the images is equal to the image of the limit of the chain.
In turn, for continuity suffices that minimal proofs use only a finite number of premises. We call this property compactness (of proofs) because it is used traditionally to infer compactness of a logic (viz., that a set of formulae is unsatisfiable if and only if it has a finite unsatisfiable subset) from its completeness (viz., a presentation is unsatisfiable if and only if it is inconsistent).
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Definition 5.12 (Compactness). An ordered proof system is compact if minimal proofs use only a finite number of premises:
Pm < ∞ For ordinary inference systems, even nonminimal proofs are finitely based.
LEMMA 5.13. Compactness implies continuity.
PROOF. Continuity requires j i≥ j μPf (
. By compactness, there are only finitely many a ∈ [ p] Pm . Let j be the smallest index in the derivation such that all a ∈ [ p] Pm are in A j . Then p ∈ Pf (A j ). Second, p ∈ μPf (A j ) because p ∈ μPf (A ∞ ), and (by the previous lemma) A j cannot provide a strictly better proof. Third,
Pm , a ∈ ∩ i≥ j A i , whence a ∈ ∪ j ∩ i≥ j A i = A ∞ . This means that p ∈ Pf (A ∞ ). As before, were p not minimal (on account of compactness and goodness), it would have already turned nonminimal at some stage k. But p is minimal at all stages i ≥ j , so p ∈ μPf (A ∞ ). Suppose, now, that c ∈ Th A ∞ , with proof p ∈ μPf (A ∞ ). By continuity, p ∈ ∩ i≥ j μPf (A i ) for some j . Thus, c ∈ Th A i for all i ≥ j . That c ∈ Th A i also for i < j follows from goodness, since A i A j implies A i ≡ A j (see Definition 3.7).
M. P. Bonacina and N. Dershowitz
Note 5.15. This does not necessarily hold for infinitary systems that violate the compactness hypothesis. Let all proofs be incomparable, including (for all i and j ):
The derivation {a j : j ≤ i} i is good, but only its limit includes the infinitary proof.
COMPLETION PROCEDURES AND PROOF PROCEDURES
The central concept underlying completion is the existence of critical proofs.
Completion alternates "expansions" that infer the conclusions of critical proofs with "contractions" that remove redundancies. More generally, theorem proving with simplification (e.g., Dershowitz [1991b] , Bonacina and Hsiang [1995] , and Bachmair and Ganzinger [1994] ) entails two processes: expansion, whereby any sound deductions (anything in Th A) may be added to the set of derived theorems; and contraction, whereby any redundancies (anything in Red A) may be removed. This inference-rule interpretation of completion, accommodating both expansion and contraction, was elaborated on in Bachmair and Dershowitz [1994] .
Definition 6.1 (Expansion and Contraction).
It is easy to see that:
PROPOSITION 6.2. -A minimal proof p ∈ μPf (A) is critical if it is not in normal form, but all of its proper subproofs are:
-We use C(A) to denote the set of all such critical proofs in A.
-The critical theorems of a presentation A are the conclusions of its critical proofs, or [C(A)] Cl . -A formula is critical for A if it is a premise of a proof smaller than a critical proof in C(A).
LEMMA 6.4. The canonical presentation has neither critical formulae nor critical theorems.
PROOF. By the definition of critical proof, C(
by the definition of Nf, it follows that C(A ) = ∅, and A has no critical theorems or critical formulae.
Since Huet [1981] , fairness has been seen as the fundamental requirement of derivations generated by completion procedures. Here, we define two fairness properties, one each for complete or saturated limits:
Definition 6.5 (Fairness).
-It is uniformly fair if
Fairness means that all critical proofs with persistent premises are "subsumed" eventually by strictly smaller proofs, whereas uniform fairness predicates the same for trivial proofs with persistent premises.
THEOREM 6.6. Presentation A is complete if C(A) Pf (A).

PROOF. Assume, by way of contradiction, that
However, there are proofs of c in Pf (A): Let's take a minimal one, that is, let p ∈ μ{A c}. By the preceding, p / ∈ Nf (A). If p is not in normal form, it means that it has some subproof(s) that is not in normal form, that is, some q p that is not in normal form. By the well-foundedness of , let q be a minimal (with respect to ) such proof. Minimality with respect to means that all subproofs of q are in normal form. Thus, we have a (possibly trivial) subproof q of p, which is not in normal form, but such that all of its subproofs are. But this is the definition of critical proof: q ∈ C(A). The hypothesis C(A) Pf (A) implies that there exists a proof r ∈ Pf (A) such that r < q. Since we have p q > r, by Replacement (8), there exists a p ∈ Pf (A) such that p < p, with r in place of q, that is, p > p r. This contradicts the fact that p is minimal. COROLLARY 6.7. If a good derivation is fair, then its limit is complete.
PROOF. By the definition of fairness, we have
This suggests completing an axiomatization A 0 by adding, step-by-step, what is needed to make for better proofs, rather than the critical ones. Clearly, a fair derivation is also completing. On the other hand, completing does not imply fair because the limit could feature a normal-form proof of some c ∈ Th A 0 , without having reduced all persistent critical proofs of c. The two notions serve different purposes: Completing is the more abstract and represents the condition for attaining a complete limit. Fair is stronger and more concrete, as it specifies a way to achieve completeness by reducing all persistent critical proofs.
A saturated limit is not necessarily contracted, unless the derivation is contracting, in which case it is canonical: THEOREM 6.8 (FAIR COMPLETION). Contracting, fair derivations are canonical, provided that the minimal proofs are unique.
PROOF. This follows from Lemma 5.8(c) (contracting derivation implies contracted limit), Corollary 6.7 (fair derivation implies complete limit), Proposition 3.11 (saturated and complete are equivalent if minimal proofs are unique), and Theorem 3.17 (saturated and contracted imply canonical).
By Proposition 3.3, this also means that each a ∈ A ∞ (= A ) is its own ultimate proof a ∈ Nf (A), thus is not susceptible to contraction.
We are left with the task of identifying sufficient conditions for saturation, in case minimal proofs are not unique: THEOREM 6.9. Presentation A is saturated if and only if A \ A Pf (A).
PROOF. Recall that A saturated means μPf (A) = Nf (A). First, we show that A \ A Pf (A) implies saturation, assuming, by way of contradiction, that μPf (A) = Nf (A). Then, there is a theorem c ∈ Th A for which a normal-form proof p * is absent from μPf (A). Instead, there is a minimal non-normalized proof p ∈ μPf (A) \ Nf (A). So, there is some
Pm \ A , since p would be in normal form were [ p] Pm ⊆ A . By hypothesis, x > r for some r ∈ Pf (A). By Replacement (8), there exists a v ∈ Pf (A) such that p > v r, contradicting the minimality of p.
For the other direction, suppose μPf (A) = Nf (A). Employing Proposition 3.6(c), 
PROOF. Uniform fairness says that
by Proposition 5.6, this is equivalent to A ∞ \ A Pf (A ∞ ), which is equivalent to A ∞ being saturated by Theorem 6.9.
INSTANCES OF THE FRAMEWORK
A class of completion procedures can be described as deduction mechanisms, wherein each step A i ; A i+1 is the composition of an expansion that adds some formulae, followed by a contraction that removes all redundant formulae (see [Dershowitz 1985, Sect. 3 One possibility for such a mechanism is to expand with all critical theorems: Definition 7.1 (Critical Completion). Critical completion is a sequence of steps:
An alternative is to add only something better:
Bulk completion is a sequence of steps:
where B(A) is a minimal subset of Pf (A) (minimal, with respect to ⊆) that is much better than critical proofs: C
(A) B(A).
Another variation on this theme is "mass completion," where the expansion component of each step A i ; m A i+1 adds normal-form trivial theorems, en masse, followed by contraction: Definition 7.3 (Mass Completion). Mass completion is a sequence of steps:
and p is short for [ p] Cl , the trivial proof of the conclusion of p. By Theorem 6.8: canonicity of the limit requires that derivations by bulk completion be fair and contracting. Fairness says that
Let p be a proof in C(A Bulk ∞ ) and let i be the smallest index such that p ∈ C(A i ). There must be such an i by continuity (Definition 5.11), given goodness-per Theorem 7.4. By the definition of bulk completion and the nature of expansion and redundancy removal (Propositions 3.6(b) and 3.16),
), such that q < p, establishing fairness. As bulk completion removes redundancies immediately, its derivations are also contracting; see Lemma 5.8(c). is also contracted, so, by Theorem 6.8, mass completion is canonical.
In the equational case, persistent critical pairs are at one and the same time both critical formulae and critical theorems, since the proof ordering is designed so that the trivial proof using a critical pair is always smaller than the peak from which the critical pair is derived. So, expansions by C(A), B(A) and M (A) are essentially the same, and bulk, mass and critical completion lead to the same result. In general, the different methods of expansion differ, as the following example demonstrates: PROOF. Ground completion is good, since Deduce and Delete do not increase proofs ( ; ⊆ ). In particular,
where n is the number of applications of S needed to build the context t, since t [u] t [v] and t[u] ≥ ≥ u v. Ground completion is fair and contracting. For example, the critical obligation
when t w, v, is resolved by Deduce. Also, since T > S, noncritical cases resolve naturally:
S(I (w, t)), S(I (t, v))) > S(T (I (w, t), I (t, v))).
Since the proof ordering is total, minimal proofs are unique, and Theorem 6.8 applies.
DISCUSSION
Completion procedures have been studied intensively since their discovery and application to automated theorem proving by Knuth and Bendix [1970] and Buchberger [1985] . The fundamental rôle of proof orderings in automated deduction, and the interpretation of completion as nondeterministic application of inference rules, received systematic treatment in Bachmair and Dershowitz [1994] . The completion principle can be applied in numerous situations [Dershowitz 1989; Bonacina and Hsiang 1995] , including the following: -equational rewriting [Peterson and Stickel 1981; Jouannaud and Kirchner 1986; ]; -Horn theories [Kounalis and Rusinowitch 1991; Dershowitz 1991a; 1991b] ; -induction [Kapur and Musser 1987; Fribourg 1989; Bachmair and Dershowitz 1994] ; -unification [Doggaz and Kirchner 1991] ; and -rewrite programs [Bonacina and Hsiang 1992; Dershowitz and Reddy 1993] .
Our abstract framework can be applied to reunderstand completion mechanisms in a fully uniform setting. Because we have been generic in our approach, the results here apply to any completion-based framework, including standard ones, like ground completion and congruence closure 7 (as illustrated herein), 7 That ground completion can be used to compute congruence closure has been known since Lankford [1975] ; using congruence closure to generate canonical rewrite systems from sets of ground equations has been investigated further in Gallier et al. [1993] and Plaisted and Sattler-Klein [1996] , among others; a recent survey comparing different ground completion and congruence closure algorithms can be found in Bachmair et al. [2003] .
equational completion (see [Burel and Kirchner 2006] ), or completion for unification, and also to derive new completion algorithms, such as for constraint solving.
In Bachmair and Dershowitz [1994] , a completion sequence is deemed fair if all persistent critical inferences are generated, and criteria are employed to eliminate redundant inferences from consideration. In Nieuwenhuis and Rubio [2001, fn. 8] , an inference sequence is held to be fair if all persistent inferences are either generated or become redundant. The approach of Bonacina and Hsiang [1995] distinguishes between fairness requirements for proof search and for saturation. The notion of fairness was formulated in terms of proof reduction with respect to a proof ordering, and made relative to the target theorem, suggesting for the first time that fairness should earn a property weaker than saturation. Specifically, a derivation was considered fair if whenever a minimal proof of the target theorem is reducible by inferences, it is reduced eventually; see Bonacina [1992, Chap. 2] . The treatment of fairness propounded here combines all these ideas. Fairness, for us, means that all persistent critical proofs are reduced, but it only attains completeness, not saturation. As we have seen, a stronger version of fairness, namely uniform fairness, is needed for saturation when the proof ordering is partial. 8 Furthermore, by putting the accent on proof search and proof reduction, the approach of Bonacina and Hsiang [1995] leads to an appreciation of the rôle of contraction as productive inference, as opposed to pure deletion. This is reflected here in the emphasis on canonicity, rather than saturation alone.
Bulk completion, as investigated here, is an abstract notion. Concrete procedures are obtained by coupling the inference system with a search plan that determines the order in which expansion and contraction steps take place. From a practical point of view, fair and contracting are two requirements for the search plan: It should schedule enough expansion steps to be fair, hence complete, and enough contraction steps to be contracting. Specific search plans may settle for some approximation of these properties. The two are intertwined, as a basic control issue is how best to avoid performing expansion inferences from premises that can be contracted because such expansions are not necessary for fairness, and would generate redundancies. This principle has led many to design search plans, called by various authors simplification-first, contraction-first, or eager contraction plans. Our definition of critical obligations also allows us to incorporate "critical pair criteria," as, for example, in Bachmair and Dershowitz [1988] .
On the other hand, making sure that contraction takes priority over expansion is not cost-free because it involves keeping a potentially very large database of formulae inter-reduced. In turn, this involves forward contraction, that is, contracting newly generated formulae with respect to already existing ones, and backward contraction, that is, contracting formulae already in the database with respect to new formulae that survived forward contraction. Conceptually, forward contraction is considered to be part of the generation of a formula, while backward contraction is considered to be a bookkeeping task for the database of formulae. In practice, an observation that helped streamline implementations of completion, and of theorem-proving strategies based on completion, was that backward contraction can be implemented by forward contraction. In other words, it suffices to detect that a formula in the database is reducible, and then subject it to forward contraction as if it were newly generated. This way, formulae generated by backward contraction are treated like formulae generated by expansion. This observation appeared in implementations since the late '80's most notably in Otter [McCune 1994 ].
In our framework, the endeavor to implement contraction efficiently is the endeavor to make contracting derivations efficient. A sufficient condition for being contracting is Red A * ∩ A ∞ = ∅. We may approach the problem by aiming at ensuring that Red A i = ∅ for all stages i of a derivation. The practical meaning and feasibility of such a requirement depends on how we define the map between the prover's operations and the steps A i ; A i+1 of a derivation. If every single expansion or contraction inference done by the prover is a step A i ; A i+1 , it is trivially impossible to have Red A i = ∅. Thus, either A i ; A i+1 corresponds to many inference steps (as is the case for bulk completion) or we aim at implementing Red A * ∩ A ∞ = ∅ by ensuring that Red A i = ∅ holds periodically.
For instance, take Otter's well-known given-clause loop. The prover maintains a list of formulae already selected as expansion parents and a list of formulae to be selected. At every iteration, it selects a given clause, performs all expansions between the given clause and the already selected clauses, and moves the given clause to the already selected list. Every new formula is forward-contracted after its generation, and those that survive forward contraction are added to the list to be selected, and applied to backward-contract elements of both lists until no further backward contraction applies. Thus, if A is the union of the two lists already selected and to be selected, Otter's givenclause loop aims at something like Red A i = ∅, for all i's that correspond to a stage after an iteration of the loop.
A more conservative approach is to implement Red A * ∩ A ∞ = ∅ by ensuring that Red B i = ∅ holds periodically and only for a subset B i ⊂ A i . This is the approach of the so-called DISCOUNT version of the given-clause loop, where only the subset of formulae eligible to be expansion parents (the already selected list augmented with the given clause) is kept inter-reduced. However, when a formula in B i is backward-contracted, its direct descendants in A i \ B i can be deleted as "orphans" [Schulz 2002 ]. Most of Otter's successors, such as Gandalf [Tammet 1997 ], SPASS [Weidenbach et al. 1999] , Vampire [Riazanov and Voronkov 2002] and WALDMEISTER [Hillenbrand 2003 ], implement both versions of the given-clause loop, while the E prover [Schulz 2002 ] features only the DISCOUNT version.
Since contraction is both an essential ingredient for efficiency and an expensive task, the appropriate balance of contraction and efficiency is still a subject of current research in the implementation of theorem provers.
